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ABSTRACT 
 
Most principals can monitor their agents, but monitoring is usually costly and imperfect. This 
paper reports the experimental results of a Monitoring Game. In this sequential game, each 
principal decides whether to monitor an agent that he is randomly paired with and then the agent 
decides whether to cheat or be honest. Monitoring is costly, but it increases the probability that 
the agent will get caught. The experiment shows that cheating is commonplace, although most 
participants do not cheat if they are monitored. Additionally, cheating is more common when 
neutral terms are used in the instructions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
mployers typically are unable to fully observe some aspects of their employees’ behavior, such as effort 
level. Consequently, employees might have the incentive to shirk or cheat (e.g., steal from the 
employer). Employers can increase the probability that employees get caught if they cheat by 
monitoring them; however, monitoring is typically costly to both the employer and the employee. 
 
This paper reports the experimental results of a sequential, perfect-information game called the Monitoring 
Game. In the Monitoring Game, a principal decides whether to monitor or not monitor an agent that he is randomly 
paired with and then, upon learning the principal’s decision, the agent decides whether to cheat or be honest.  If the 
agent is not caught, then cheating increases her payoff and reduces the principal’s payoff. Monitoring is costly to 
both the principal and the agent, but it increases the probability that the agent will get caught.  
 
The main contribution of this paper to the literature is that, to the best of my knowledge, it is the first paper 
to examine the strategic interactions between a principal and an agent when the principal can monitor the agent but 
monitoring is imperfect (i.e., the probability of catching a cheating agent is less than one, even if the agent is 
monitored). Most research on principal-agent problems investigates the optimal contract that the principal can 
design and whether participants reach that contract in a controlled environment. However, principals can control 
other aspects of their interaction with agents, such as whether to monitor them or not. For example, employers can 
monitor their employees by hiring more middle-level managers, using software to track their employees’ activities 
online, or requiring periodic reports from their employees. These actions, however, are costly to employers. 
Employees usually also incur a cost from monitoring since monitoring makes their working environment less 
comfortable and may subject them to additional requirements, such as reporting their activities.  
 
The experiment shows that cheating is common and occurs in higher frequency when agents are not 
monitored. Furthermore, despite the frequency of cheating, monitoring is uncommon. Finally, using non-neutral 
terms, such as cheating and monitoring, instead of neutral terms significantly reduces the frequency of cheating but 
does not affect the frequency of monitoring.  
 
The Monitoring Game is a type of a principal-agent game, a game in which a principal, such as employers, 
wants his agent (e.g., employee) to behave in a costly way that will benefit the principal, but is unable observe some 
aspect of the agent’s behavior, such as effort. In the Monitoring Game, the principal wants the agent to be honest, 
but he cannot directly observe whether the agent is cheating or not. Several researchers studied principal-agent 
E 
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interactions. Marris and Mueller (1980) provide a summary of the early literature on principal-agent dilemmas. 
Besanko, Regibeau and Rockett (2005) use a theoretical model to illustrate the principal-agent dilemma, while 
Strausz (2006) compares a principal-agent model under a deterministic and a stochastic environment.  
 
Others examine principal-agent dilemmas in a controlled experiment (Guth et al, 1998; Frederickson and 
Waller, 2005; and elsewhere). Casadesus-Masanell (2004), argues that external incentives are not always necessary 
to elicit a desirable behavior out of an employee. In fact, research has shown that reciprocity is common in both 
controlled and uncontrolled environments. Schechter (2007) finds that farmers in Paraguay often give potential 
thieves a gift so that they will not steal as much from their farm. Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) find that most 
employers were willing to pay above market wages and most employees reciprocate by exerting more effort. Fehr 
and Gachter (1998 & 2000) demonstrate that many people have a proclivity to reciprocate when others act toward 
them with kindness and to retaliate when they think that they are being treated unfairly. Employees may have an 
intrinsic desire to be trustworthy based on social norms, ethical standards, and altruism (see Camerer 2003 for 
review of literature).  
 
Königstein, Kovács and Zala-Mezö (2003) find through surveys that players typically agree on what is 
considered fair. Büchner et al (2004) utilize a three-person ultimatum game in which one person, a principal, makes 
an offer on how to split an award, while each of the two responders have a veto power to decide whether the offer is 
acceptable. They find that mutual trust can be effective in inducing costly but desirable behaviors. Fehr and Schmidt 
(2004) show that most employees prefer a bonus contract that does not guarantee them a payoff, but implies that 
they will receive a bonus if they work hard. In their experiment, bonus contracts outperformed piece-meal contracts 
that paid per unit of effort.  
 
Trust is important in most interactions and is often achieved despite theoretical predictions to the contrary. 
Ben-Ner et al (2004) find that cooperation is common in a two-part dictator game when one participant dictates how 
much money she will share with another participant and then their roles are reversed. They find that there is a strong 
correlation between the amounts sent in the first round and the amounts sent in the second round when the roles are 
reversed. Trust, however, is common even when there is no opportunity for reciprocity. Berg et al (1995) examine 
an Investment Game where a first mover can send any portion of $10 to another participant. The amount given is 
tripled and then the second mover chooses how much money to share with the first mover. They find that first 
movers send $5.16, on average, and many send $10 even though the unique Nash equilibrium is for the first mover 
to send nothing. Finally, Eckel and Wilson (2004) find that trust does not relate to one’s risk aversion and that some 
individuals are trusting even if they are paired with a stranger in a one-shot game. Therefore, it is possible that 
principals in the experiment reported here will trust the agents that they are paired with and not monitor them, even 
if theory predicts otherwise. 
 
Nonetheless, trust is not universal. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) find that 40% of all participants only 
trust women, while 9% only trust men in a two-stage trust game. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that minorities 
that have been traditionally discriminated against and people who had a traumatic experience are less trusting.  
 
The Monitoring Game examines whether employers trust employees in a controlled environment and 
whether that trust is reciprocated. As the previous experiment shows, individuals are often willing to trust others 
even when they do not know who they are paired with, and that trust is usually reciprocated. Furthermore, the 
experiment investigates what affect, if any, does framing have on participants’ behavior.  
 
GAME STRUCTURE AND PREDICTIONS 
 
The Monitoring Game is a sequential, perfect information, one-shot game between two players - a principal 
and an agent. The principal, who moves first, decides whether to monitor (M) or not monitor (NM) an agent; then, 
upon learning the principal’s decision, the agent decides whether to cheat (C) or be honest (H). Once the agent 
makes her decision, nature determines through chance whether the agent is caught (CA) or not caught (NC).  
 
If the principal does not to monitor the agent there is a probability p that the agent will get caught if she 
cheats. If the principal monitors the agent there is a probability q that the agent will get caught if she cheats, whereas 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – April, 2011 Volume 9, Number 4 
© 2011 The Clute Institute  3 
q > p. Thus, monitoring increases the probability that the agent would get caught, but it also imposes a monitoring 
cost of c on the principal and the agent. The principal and the agent can each receive a benefit of b if they cooperate 
– cooperating means that the principal does not monitor and the agent does not cheat. If the agent successfully 
cheats (cheats and does not get caught), her payoff increases by t and the principal payoff falls by t. t could represent 
the amount that the agent steals from the principal. If the agent cheats and is caught, she gets nothing. 
 
 The Monitoring Game is illustrated as a game tree in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows both the general payoff for 
the Monitoring Game and the specific payoffs given the b, c, and t that were chosen for this experiment. In the 
experiment discussed here, b = 15, c = 3, t = 6, p = ¼, and q = ½. Under these parameters, a rational, risk neutral 
agent will choose to cheat if she is not monitored and to be honest if she is monitored. The payoffs are in 
Experimental Pesos (EP), whereas each EP was worth 10 cent at the end of the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Game Tree for the Monitoring Game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the agent cheats, her expected value is p(0) + (1 – p)(b + t) if the principal does not monitor her and q(0) 
+ (1 – q)(b – c + t) if he does. Under the experimental parameters, the agent’s expected value from cheating is 15.75 
EP if she is not monitored and 9 EP if she is monitored. A rational, risk-neutral agent would choose to cheat if she is 
not monitored (NM; C) and to be honest if she is monitored (M; H). Thus, if both rationality and risk neutrality are 
common knowledge, the principal will choose to monitor the agent knowing that it would lead to outcome (M; H) 
with a payoff of 12 EP for him, which is better than outcome (NM; C) with an expected payoff of 10.5 EP.
1
 
 
As long as the agent is risk neural, or more accurately not very risk loving or very risk averse, and the 
principal is rational and assumes that the agent is rational and risk neutral, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium 
for this game is for the principal to monitor the agent and for the agent to be honest (M; H). However, this 
conclusion might not hold for another set of parameters. For example, for a given set of b, p, and c, if t is sufficiently 
high or q is sufficiently low the agent will cheat even if she is being monitored. Similarly, for a given set of p, q, t, 
and b, if c is sufficiently high the principal will opt not to monitor.  
 
 The assumption of risk neutrality may not be correct, although, it is an assumption that is commonly made 
in theoretical models (Cohen, Jaffary and Tanios, 1985). Several studies on risk aversion find that people tend to be 
risk averse when there is some risk of a significant punishment and are risk-loving when there is some probability 
                                                 
1 The principal expected payoff if he does not monitors the agent and the agent decides to cheat is p(b) + (1 – p)(b – t).  Under the 
parameters of the experiment, the expected payoff is .25(15) + .75(9) = 10.5 EP. 
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(even a very small probability) of receiving a large award (Cohen, Jaffary and Tanios, 1985; Friedman and Savage 
1948; and elsewhere). For instance, many people buy lottery tickets even though their expected value from the ticket 
is negative.   
 
Consequently, for any positive p (p > 0) agents who are sufficiently risk averse will opt to be honest (H) 
when they are not monitored even if they are only concerned with their own payoff. On the other hand, as long as 
monitoring is imperfect (q < 1), rational agents who are very risk loving might opt to cheat when they are being 
monitored since there is some probability that cheating will lead to a higher payoff. Therefore, we can make game 
theoretical predictions for the parameters of this experiment if and only if we assume that the agent is risk neutral 
and rational and that the principal is rational and assumes that the agent is risk neutral and rational.
2
  
 
There are three reasons why participants might deviate from the subgame perfect equilibrium (M; H). First, 
some participants may not fully understand the game; though, the instructions were read out loud and participants 
completed a couple of exercises to assure that they understood how the game worked. Secondly, as previous 
experiments suggest, participants may not be exclusively concerned with their own payoff. Particularly, agents who 
are being trusted (not monitored) might reciprocate by being honest even though cheating gives them a higher 
expected payoff. Finally, some agent may be sufficiently risk loving and choose to cheat no matter what the 
principal does or may be sufficiently risk averse and choose to always be honest no matter what the principal does. 
Similarly, some principals might assume that the agent that they are paired with is very risk averse or very risk 
loving and, therefore, opt to not monitor.
3
   
 
 One weakness of this experiment is that it is not clear if a deviation from the subgame perfect equilibrium 
is due to unselfish behavior on the part of the participants or the possibility that certain participants are significantly 
risk averse or risk loving. This problem can be further explored in future experiments by setting p equal to zero.
4
 
This experiment, however, is designed to simulate a more realistic situation where agents can still get caught even if 
the principal does not make special effort to monitor them. For instance, an employee may still get caught stealing 
by her co-workers or managers even if she is not directly monitored. Even though it is not possible to distinguish 
whether deviations from the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies is due to selflessness or risk aversion, it is 
probably reasonable to assume that for at least some of the principals the decision not to monitor constitutes an act 
of trust whereas for some of the agents the decision not to cheat is a way to reciprocate for the principal’s trust.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
Participants in the experiment were students from the E. Craig Wall Sr. College of Business Administration 
at Coastal Carolina University who were solicited from various undergraduate classes. Upon arriving, students were 
randomly divided into eight “employers” and eight “employees.” Although the author refers to one group as 
employers and the second group as employees in this paper, the results of this experiment are relevant to other types 
of interactions amongst principals and agents. The two groups were seated facing opposite walls and were not 
allowed to communicate. Then, the instructions for the experiment were read out loud and the participants were 
asked to complete a couple of exercises to assure that they understood how the experimental payoffs are calculated.
5
 
 
 Each session consisted of eight decision periods. During each period each employer was randomly paired 
with an employee, but the employer did not know who he was paired with. Each employer was paired with each 
employee once and only once, much like Andreoni’s (1995) strangers treatment. The employers had two minutes to 
                                                 
2 Since the game is a sequential, perfect-information game, it is not necessary for the agent (the second mover) to know that the 
principal knows that she is rational and risk neutral or to know that the principal is rational and risk neutral. Thus, common 
knowledge or rationality and risk neutrality is not necessary to solve this game.  
3 If the principal assumes that the agent is very risk averse or risk loving, the principal should choose not to monitor the agent in 
order to avoid the monitoring cost since in either case the principal’s decision to monitor or not will not affect the agent’s 
decision to be honest or cheat. 
4 If p = 0, then theory predicts that even a very risk averse agent will cheat if she is not monitored. 
5 Instructions for the experiment are available online at: 
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/10046738/Instructions%20for%20Experiment%20%28trust%29.doc 
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indicate on a slip of paper whether they were going to or not going to monitor the employee that they were paired 
with. Monitoring would cost both the employer and the employee he was paired up with three Experimental Pesos 
(EP), the equivalent of 30 cent. 
 
Each slip was handed to a researcher who inputted the information into an Excel spreadsheet and then 
distributed it to the employee that the employer was paired with. After an employee discovered whether she was 
being monitored or not, she had two minutes to decide whether to cheat or be honest. If an employee decided to be 
honest, she would place a blue chip into an opaque envelope. If an employee decided to cheat, she would place a red 
chip into the envelope. Then, the envelopes were collected and the chips were discretely placed into the box of the 
corresponding employers without anyone, including the experimenter, seeing what the chips’ colors were. The chip 
that each employee selected was mixed with three blue chips that were already inside the box. If an employer 
decided not to monitor his employee, then the researcher would take one chip out of his box. If an employer decided 
to monitor his employee, then the researcher would take two chips out of his box. After the chips were taken out, the 
experimenter examined the remaining chips in the boxes to see if each agent cheated or not. 
 
If an employee decided not to cheat, then both players would receive 15 EP if the employer decided not to 
monitor and 12 EP if he decided to monitor (since monitoring cost both the employer and the employee 3 EP). 
Cheating would increase the employee’s payoff by 6 EP and reduce the employer’s payoff by 6 EP if the employee 
was not caught. The employee was considered caught if she placed a red chip in the box and that chip was randomly 
taken out. If the employee was caught, she would get 0 EP and the employer would get 12 EP if he elected to 
monitor and 15 EP if he elected to not monitor. The payments are shown in Table 1. As discussed in the previous 
section, if rationality and risk-neutrality are common knowledge, then economic theory predicts that employers 
would always opt to monitor their employees and employees would not cheat. 
 
 
Table 1:  Payoff Table 
Employer’s 
Decision 
Employee’s 
Decision 
Prob. of being 
caught 
Result Employer’s Payoff Employee’s Payoff 
Monitor 
Cheat 2 in 4 (.50) 
Caught 12 EP 0 EP 
Not Caught 6 EP 18 EP 
Not Cheat 0 in 4 (.00)  12 EP 12 EP 
Not Monitor 
Cheat 1 in 4 (.25) 
Caught 15 EP 0 EP 
Not Caught 9 EP 21 EP 
Not Cheat 0 in 4 (.00)  15 EP 15 EP 
 
 
Both the employers and the employees were privately informed on a slip of paper what their payoff for the 
period was. Therefore, agents learned at the end of every period whether they were caught or not and employers 
learned whether the agent that they were paired with cheated or not (and whether she was caught if she cheated). At 
the end of the session, all the participants were paid their earnings plus a $5 fee for showing up on time in cash. 
Final payments were made in private in a separate room. 
 
 The experiment was repeated in 8 independent sessions. Four of the sessions were conducted as a No 
Framing Treatment and the other four sessions were conducted as a Framing Treatment. In the No Framing 
Treatment, the instructions and the communication throughout the experiment utilized neutral terms. Specifically, in 
the No Framing Treatment “employers” were called “observers” and employees were called “agents.” Similarly, 
“cheating” and “being honest” were referred to simply as “Action A” and “Action B,” respectively. Finally, 
monitoring and not monitoring was referred to as “Action 1” and “Action 2” respectively. Other than these basic 
differences in terminology used in the instructions the two treatments were identical.  
 
RESULTS 
 
 The Monitoring Game was used to investigate how principals and agents behave when principals can 
opt to use costly but imperfect monitoring. The experiment also sought to investigate how using a non-neutral 
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language affects participants’ behavior. The experiment yielded several interesting results. The frequency of each 
outcome is shown by treatment in Table 2 and by session in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 2:  Occurrence of Outcome by Treatment (in percent) 
 
Treatment 
 
No Framing Framing Total 
Monitor & Cheat 9.77 2.34 6.05 
Monitor & Honest 22.66 34.38 28.52 
Not Monitor & Cheat 41.80 27.34 34.57 
Not Monitor & Honest 25.78 35.94 30.86 
 
 
Table 3:  Occurrence of Outcome by Session (in percent) 
 
Session 
 
NF1 NF2 NF3 NF4 F1 F2 F3 F4 
Monitor & Cheat 15.63 6.25 4.69 7.32 11.44 1.56 1.56 4.69 
Monitor & Honest 18.75 10.94 39.06 61.04 95.37 53.13 23.44 26.56 
Not-Monitor & Cheat 40.63 40.63 29.69 46.39 72.48 31.25 21.88 20.31 
Not-Monitor & Honest 25.00 42.19 26.56 41.50 64.85 14.06 53.13 48.44 
 
 
Result 1 –Principals usually opt not to monitor the agent that they were paired with.  
 
 Principals elected to monitor agents 34.6% of the time. Interestingly, only one out of 64 principals in 
the experiments monitored the agents that he was paired with every single time, even though monitoring the agent 
was the sub-game perfect strategy (as explained earlier). The median number of times that a given principal opted to 
monitor agents was 3, the mean was 2.44, and the mode was 4. Figure 2 shows the frequency (number of times out 
of the eight sessions) that employers opted to monitor the employee that they were paired with. Note that 9 
employers did not monitor their employee once throughout the experiment and few employers monitored their 
employee more than 4 out of 8 times. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Frequency of Monitoring by Principals 
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Result 2 – Cheating was fairly common and occurred at a significantly higher rate when agents were not 
monitored.  
 
 There was a considerable amount of cheating in the experiment. Overall, the agents cheated 40.6% of 
the time. As economic theory predicts, cheating was far less common when agents were monitored because the 
probability that they would get caught was higher. Agents cheated 52.8% of the time when they were not monitored 
and only 17.5% of the time when they were monitored. In fact, agents cheated with a lower frequency when they 
were monitored in all eight sessions. Based on a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, there is only a .4% chance 
(p = .004) that the lower frequency of cheating when the agents were monitored was a random coincidence; 
therefore, the author rejects the hypothesis that monitoring does not reduce the agents’ cheating with a .05 level of 
significance. This result indicates that agents were more concerned about their expected payoff than about 
reciprocating the principal’s trust. 
 
 Interestingly, agents who cheated and got caught were, on average, were 21.4% less likely to cheat the 
following period than agents who cheated and did not get caught. Thus, agents were less likely to cheat if they were 
caught the in the previous period even though the fact that they were caught did not affect the probability that they 
would get caught in the following period since the experiment consisted of 8 independent, one-shot games with 
consistent probabilities.  
 
Result 3 – Cheating was less common when non-neutral terms were used, but the amount of monitoring was 
not significantly affected by framing.  
 
 Cheating was less common in the Framing Treatment, where agents cheated 29.7% of the time, than in 
the No Framing Treatment, where agents cheated 51.6% of the time. Furthermore, agents cheated only 6.4% of the 
time when they were monitored in the Framing Treatment compared to 30.1% of the time in the No Framing 
Treatment. Framing the instruction also decreased the portion of instances in which agents cheated when they were 
not monitored from 61.8% to 43.2%.    
 
 When the sessions are ordered from the session with the highest amount to the session with the lowest 
amount of cheating, as shown in Figure 3, the three sessions with the lowest amount of cheating are all Framing 
sessions. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test shows that there is only a .0143 probability that framing the 
experiment did not reduce cheating. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis that framing reduces cheating is accepted 
with a .05 level of significance. Figure 3 shows the frequency of cheating by session.  
 
Figure 3:  Frequency of Cheating by Session 
 
 
 Framing did not seem to significantly affect the proclivity of principals to monitor their agents. 
Principals opted to monitor their agents 32.4% of the time in the No Framing Treatment and 36.7% of the time in the 
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Framing Treatment. When the sessions are ordered by frequency of monitoring, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-
sum test cannot reject the null hypothesis that framing has no effect on the amount of monitoring.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 The experiment reported here was designed to simulate a typical interaction amongst principals and 
agents such as employers and employees. Employers in the Monitoring Game chose to either engage or not engage 
in costly but imperfect monitoring and then the employees that they were paired with chose either to cheat or to be 
honest. The experiment yielded several interesting results. First, most employers are reluctant to monitor employees 
even though theory predicts that they would monitor their employees if rationality and risk-neutrality are a common 
knowledge.  
 
 The experiment did not examine the risk neutrality of the participants, which is a very difficult variable 
to estimate. Therefore, some employers might have opted not to monitor the employee that they were paired with 
because they assumed that the employee was very risk averse or risk loving and, thus, will always make the same 
decision no matter what employer did. However, a more likely explanation is that employers were reluctant to 
monitor because they wanted to avoid the monitoring cost or because they preferred to trust the employees.  
 
 Secondly, employees commonly cheated and were more likely to cheat when they were not being 
monitored. This indicates that most employees do not reciprocate the trust that employers place in them. However, 
the experiment reported here is composed of one-shot games, whereas actual interaction amongst employers and 
employees is typically repeated, which makes it easier to build trust.  
 
 Thirdly, using non-neutral terms significantly reduced cheating but did not change the frequency of 
monitoring. Therefore, employees are a less likely to engage in an undesirable behavior when that behavior is 
labeled as cheating (or another negative term) and are more likely to engage in a desirable behavior when that 
behavior is labeled as positive. The experiment stresses the importance of correctly labeling desirable and 
undesirable behaviors, even when labeling the behaviors does not affect the expected payoffs for the individuals 
involved.  
 
 The experiment elucidates the difficult dilemma that employers face. Based on the experiment, 
employees clearly respond to monitoring by cheating less; nonetheless, monitoring is costly and most employers 
seem to avoid it. However, the combination of monitoring employees and clearly setting expectations (i.e., framing 
the interaction) may almost completely eliminate cheating. Cheating occurred only 6.4% of the time when the 
instructions were framed and the employees were monitored. Thus, clearly setting expectations and monitoring 
employees can be effective even if monitoring is imperfect. 
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